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 CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY AND CORPORATE FINANCIAL
 PERFORMANCE: THE ROLES OF STAKEHOLDER RESPONSE
 AND POLITICAL ACCESS
 HELI WANG
 Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
 CUILI QIAN
 City University of Hong Kong
 Corporate philanthropy is expected to positively affect firm financial performance
 because it helps firms gain sociopolitical legitimacy, which enables them to elicit
 positive stakeholder responses and to gain political access. The positive philanthropy-
 performance relationship is stronger for firms with greater public visibility and for
 those with better past performance, as philanthropy by these firms gains more positive
 stakeholder responses. Firms that are not government-owned or politically well con-
 nected were shown to benefit more from philanthropy, as gaining political resources is
 more critical for such firms. Empirical analyses using data on Chinese firms listed on
 stock exchanges from 2001 to 2006 support these arguments.
 Research on the relationship between corporate
 philanthropy and firm profitability has largely been
 inconclusive. Some scholars have argued that cor-
 porate philanthropy positively affects corporate fi-
 nancial performance because decisions regarding
 charitable contributions can be made strategically
 to raise a company's image and reputation, as well
 as to increase the value of its "moral capital"
 (Brammer & Millington, 2005; Godfrey, 2005; Por-
 ter & Kramer, 2002; Saiia, Carroll, & Buchholtz,
 2003). Philanthropy may promote products and en-
 hance brand image, thus serving the role of cause-
 related marketing (File & Prince, 1998). In addition,
 it can mitigate the risks of reputational losses and
 secure critical resources from stakeholders, hence
 providing insurance-like protection (Fombrun,
 Gardberg, & Barnett, 2000; Godfrey, 2005; Williams
 & Barrett, 2000). On the other hand, other scholars
 have argued that corporate philanthropy has a neg-
 ative net impact on corporate financial perfor-
 mance because it may represent a pure corporate
 expenditure that diverts valuable resources to areas
 unrelated to operations (Friedman, 1970). More-
 over, many firms lack the expertise for efficient
 We would like to thank the seminar participants at
 Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. Spe-
 cial thanks to Associate Editor Gerry Sanders and the
 anonymous AMJ reviewers for their helpful comments
 and thoughtful suggestions.
 Editor's note: The manuscript for this article was ac-
 cepted for publication during the term of AMJ s previous
 editor-in-chief, Duane Ireland.
 investment in social causes, and top managers may
 use philanthropy to boost their personal reputa-
 tions and to advance their careers (Galaskiewicz,
 1997; Haley, 1991). Thus, rather than diverting cor-
 porate resources to philanthropic activities, firms
 should make better use of those resources to im-
 prove their operational efficiency (Fried-
 man, 1970).
 Empirical research examining the relationship
 between corporate philanthropy and corporate fi-
 nancial performance has also generated mixed re-
 sults. Some scholars have examined corporate phi-
 lanthropy as a component of the larger domain of
 corporate social responsibility. For instance, in an
 analysis of seven large chemical companies, Griffin
 and Mahon (1997) discovered that several dimen-
 sions of corporate social performance are signifi-
 cantly related to financial performance, but they
 did not find a significant relationship for corporate
 philanthropy. Similarly, Berman, Wicks, Kotha,
 and Jones (1999) found that corporate involvement
 in community relations, which includes philan-
 thropic activities, has little influence on corporate
 financial performance. In contrast, a meta-analysis
 by Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes (2003) suggested
 that corporate philanthropy is positively correlated
 with corporate financial performance; moreover,
 this relationship is stronger than that between other
 measures of corporate social performance and fi-
 nancial results. A similar pattern of mixed results
 has also been found in studies purely on corporate
 philanthropy. For example, Wokutch and Spencer
 (1987) found hints of a positive correlation between
 1159
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 corporate philanthropy and financial performance,
 although they warned that the relationship might
 be moderated by firms' involvement in illegal ac-
 tivities. On the other hand, applying structural
 equation modeling with a sample of Fortune 1,000
 firms, Seifert, Morris, and Bartkus (2004) did not
 find a significant relationship between corporate
 philanthropy and financial performance.
 More recent empirical studies have explored the
 possibility of nonlinear relationships between cor-
 porate philanthropy and financial performance
 (Brammer & Millington, 2008; Wang, Choi, & Li,
 2008), but the results have again been mixed. For
 instance, using a sample of 537 firms listed on the
 London Stock Exchange from 1990 to 1999, Bram-
 mer and Millington (2008) found that firms with
 both unusually high and low charitable contribu-
 tions had better financial performance than those
 making an intermediate level of contributions.
 Firms making unusually low contributions did best
 in the short term, but those making unusually large
 contributions did best in the long term. On the
 other hand, using a panel data set of 817 U.S. firms
 stock-exchange-listed from 1987 to 1999, Wang,
 Choi, and Li (2008) found an inverse U-shaped
 relationship between corporate philanthropy and
 financial performance.
 The continuing conceptual controversy and em-
 pirical inconclusiveness have resulted in a frag-
 mented literature in this area, hindering research
 and further progress. One way to reconcile this
 inconclusiveness is to recognize that firms do not
 benefit equally from making charitable contribu-
 tions and that the relationship between corporate
 philanthropy and corporate financial performance
 is contingent on some critical social and political
 factors. Instead of simply listing some contingency
 factors ad hoc, we set out to identify those factors
 systematically by uncovering the underlying mech-
 anisms through which corporate philanthropy may
 have a positive impact on corporate financial per-
 formance. In particular, we argue that corporate
 philanthropy helps firms gain sociopolitical legiti-
 macy, which further enables them to elicit positive
 stakeholder responses and to gain political access.
 Accordingly, two mechanisms are critical in deter-
 mining the potential benefit that a firm can obtain
 from charitable contributions: stakeholder re-
 sponses and political access. Firms may reap either
 one or both of these benefits from their philan-
 thropic activities. Philanthropy can help firms gain
 social legitimacy or approval from the public, in-
 cluding their key stakeholders, which helps them
 obtain cooperation and support from stakeholders
 including employees, suppliers, customers, and
 residents of a colocated community. Firms might
 also gain political legitimacy or app oval from gov-
 ernment officials through corporate philanthropy,
 which enables them to get access to political re-
 sources often critical to their development.
 Although it is dif icult to directly model and
 measure social and political legitimacies, it is pos-
 sible to identify some contingent factors that are
 thought to affect the extent to which firms may
 benefit from gaining these legitimacies. Building on
 previous research on firm visibility and stake-
 holder expectations (Dooley & Lerner, 1994; Pol-
 lock & Gulati, 2007; Pollock, Rindova, & Maggitti,
 2008; Rindova, Williamson, Petkova, & Sever,
 2005; Suchman, 1995), we argue that stakeholders
 should respond more positively to corporate phi-
 lanthropy carried out by firms with higher visibil-
 ity (those with higher levels of advertising intensity
 and operating in more developed markets), and by
 firms with higher stakeholder expectations (those
 with good past financial performance), since gain-
 ing social legitimacy is more important for such
 firms. In addition, in the economies of many na-
 tions, including developed ones, their national gov-
 er ments play a critical role in influencing the ex-
 tent to which firms gain resources and enjoy policy
 benefits. Moreover, government ownership of firms
 is not rare, even in many developed economies
 (Faccio & Lang, 2002; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, &
 Shleife , 1999). Applying resource dependence the-
 ory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), we argue that some
 firms are more dependent on thei  nation's govern-
 ment for critical resources than others (e.g., Hill-
 ma , 2005; Meznar & Nigh, 1995; Peng & Luo,
 2000). Along these lines, firms with higher govern-
 ment dependence should be in greater need of gain-
 ing political legitimacy and thus are more likely to
 benefit from corporate philanthropy.
 These ideas were tested in the context of a tran-
 sition economy - China. Previous work in the field
 has mostly examined Western contexts such as the
 United States and the United Kingdom. Although
 the conceptual arguments explored in this study
 are quite general, a transition economy provides a
 useful sociopolitical context in which to extend
 these arguments and test them in a profound and
 fine-grained manner. The diversity in China's mar-
 kets and institutional environments lets us observe
 large variations in some of the specific factors po-
 tentially relevant to the relationship between cor-
 porate philanthropy and financial performance.
 Moreover, Chinese firms remain highly dependent
 on their national government despite the country's
 ongoing transition from a centrally controlled to a
 market-based economy.
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 CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY AND
 CORPORATE FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE
 Eliciting Positive Stakeholder Responses and
 Gaining Political Resources through Corporate
 Philanthropy
 Corporate philanthropy involves gifts or mone-
 tary contributions given by corporations to social
 and charitable causes, such as those associated
 with education, culture, the arts, minorities, health
 care, and disaster relief (Godfrey, 2005; Seifert et
 al., 2004; Wang, Choi, & Li, 2008). According to the
 traditional view of firms, they exist solely to serve
 the interests of their shareholders, which they do
 by maximizing economic efficiency (Bremmer,
 1987; Friedman, 1970). However, the growing in-
 fluence of firms in many aspects of social and po-
 litical life in recent years has led to an increasing
 interest in not only the economic but also the social
 consequences of their actions (Paine, 2002; Rosen,
 Simon, Vincent, MacLeod, Fox, & Thea, 2003).
 Consequently, a growing number of stakeholders,
 including those who have direct relationships with
 firms, such as employees, customers, suppliers,
 and even some shareholders, have come to perceive
 corporate philanthropy as an appropriate and legit-
 imate corporate activity (Margolis & Walsh, 2003;
 Sharfman, 1994). In some societies, governments
 are in favor of corporate charitable work because it
 helps reduce governmental burdens. When govern-
 ments either have limited resources of their own or
 are constrained from directly distributing resources
 to certain community areas, the contributions of
 enterprises are considered legitimate and are im-
 mediately appreciated (Dickson, 2003).
 Thus, corporate philanthropy helps a firm
 achieve sociopolitical legitimacy, which is ob-
 tained when the general public, including key
 stakeholders or government officials, accept a firm
 as appropriate and right in terms of existing norms
 and laws (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994: 648). We have to
 note that gaining acceptance from stakeholders and
 government officials should not, by itself, have a
 direct bearing on the financial consequences of
 charitable activities. But the allocation and use of
 certain resources necessary for the continued sur-
 vival and financial success of a firm are often not
 fully controlled by the firm alone, but rather by
 some key stakeholders as well as some government
 bodies (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). To the extent that
 corporate philanthropy helps address the concerns
 of a firm's key stakeholders and those of govern-
 ment (Frooman, 1999), we propose that philan-
 thropy can have an important influence on the
 firm's financial performance.
 This view largely agrees with some recent devel-
 opments in the stakeholder theory and corporate
 social responsibility literatures suggesting that a
 firm may take an instrumental or strategic approach
 to its stakeholders to manage their impacts on its
 overall objectives (Berman et al., 1999; Godfrey,
 2005; Jones, 1995; Porter & Kramer, 2002). Viewed
 from this perspective, corporate philanthropy can
 be regarded as a means by which firms can build
 better relations with their primary stakeholders
 (Saiia et al., 2003) and thus elicit positive re-
 sponses, such as increased participation and sup-
 port (Berman et al., 1999; Haley, 1991). For in-
 stance, when a firm's employees perceive it as
 virtuous or having moral worth, they should be
 more willing to identify strongly with the firm
 (Dutton, Dukerich, & Harquail, 1994). Stronger
 identification can promote cooperation and proso-
 cial behavior (Kramer, 1991; O'Reilly & Chatman,
 1986; Organ, 1988). Corporate philanthropy can
 promote such perceptions. Moreover, companies
 that make substantial contributions are likely to
 promote a socially responsible public image, which
 could extend to other aspects of business practice,
 such as high standards of product quality and cus-
 tomer care (Adams & Hardwick, 1998: 642). This
 should, in turn, help a firm gain customer support.
 In addition, charitable activities may help firms
 gain political legitimacy, which allows them to ob-
 tain valuable political resources that can be critical
 to their long-term survival and financial success
 (Hillman, 2005). Contributions to social causes
 send signals to government bodies that corporate
 managers are sincere in dealing with their stake-
 holders. This may mitigate the need for government
 to impose costly regulations, such as labor and
 consumer protection (Adams & Hardwick, 1998:
 642), thus helping firms gain favorable policies and
 other support from their government. For instance,
 in its campaign to fight malaria in African coun-
 tries, Exxon Mobil has not only benefited from an
 enhanced reputation, but has also built a strong
 relationship with local governments. This relation-
 ship building has helped the firm acquire resources
 from those governments, thereby advancing its stra-
 tegic goals (Porter & Kramer, 2002: 11). Then, po-
 litical leverage generated through corporate philan-
 thropy may lead to a future government policy
 decisions favorable to a firm (Neiheisel, 1994; Sán-
 chez, 2000). Corporate philanthropy is especially
 appreciated when governments do not have enough
 resources to engage in community and social wel-
 fare projects, and business contributions help alle-
 viate their burdens (Dickson, 2003). Studies have
 demonstrated that corporate philanthropy can help
 ease access to credit, which governments often in-
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 fluence or even tightly control (Neiheisel, 1994). In
 summary,
 Hypothesis 1. Corporate philanthropy is posi-
 tively related to a firm's financial performance .
 Corporate Philanthropy in China
 Traditionally, the Chinese are deeply influenced
 by the Buddhist, Daoist, and Confucian philoso-
 phies. Buddhists believe that compassion is a prin-
 cipal virtue in life. People should be kind-hearted
 and benevolent. Similarly, Daoism emphasizes that
 a person should be aware of the needs of others.
 What may be the most important force shaping
 China's social values is the widely held set of Con-
 fucian beliefs, which define family relations, social
 order, and trust. In Confucianism, a person who
 spreads bounty or who rescues people is consid-
 ered a sage.1 One of the most famous Confucian
 sayings is, "A nation or a family does not worry that
 it has little but that that little is unevenly appor-
 tioned, does not worry that it is poor but that it is
 unstable" (Watson, 2007: 115).
 Despite their significant departure from tradi-
 tional Chinese values, the more recent communist
 ideologies share a similar view that there should be
 no disparity in the distribution of wealth in society.
 Communism is based on common property and the
 equal distribution of wealth; it aspires to an egali-
 tarian and classless society based on common own-
 ership and control. One of its goals is to extinguish
 private ownership. In China, the Communist Party
 once viewed wealth as the outcome of the exploi-
 tation of the poor, and thus undesirable, and such
 negative attitudes toward the rich still persist
 among many Chinese. Although the rapid develop-
 ment of the Chinese economy has resulted in pos-
 itive changes in the public's perceptions of the
 wealthy, Chinese people are still deeply influenced
 by traditional values and communist ideologies
 (Hofstede, 2001; Leung, 2008). Therefore, they
 praise compassionate behaviors, and the Chinese
 stakeholders of firms are more likely to embrace
 those that contribute generously. The reactions of
 Chinese stakeholders to corporate contributions af-
 ter the earthquake in Sichuan on May 12, 2008,
 exemplify this. Vanke, one of the largest and most
 profitable Chinese real estate firms, donated only
 CNY2 million for earthquake relief. The public
 strongly criticized this relatively small donation.
 The chairman of Vanke subsequently defended the
 company's behavior by stating, "Two million is
 sufficient." This statement further induced a repu-
 tational crisis for the company, resulting in a 12
 percent decrease in its stock price in just five days
 (May 15-20). In contrast, the JDB group, a much
 smaller company in terms of both total revenue and
 profitability, made a donation of CNY100 million,
 the largest donation by any Chinese company.
 Sales of the firm's main product - Wanglaoji , an
 herbal tea - dramatically increased within days.
 The public even circulated an article posted on the
 web praising Wanglaoji .
 In addition to eliciting positive stakeholder re-
 sponses, corporate philanthropy on the part of Chi-
 nese firms lacking strong political connections may
 have a role in creating goodwill with the national
 government, thus conferring legitimacy and access
 to political resources. In the absence of efficient
 market structures and contractual law hardened by
 routine compliance and enforcement, Chinese
 firms may need political allies in the negotiation
 and enforcement of contracts (Nee, 1992). More-
 over, the political uncertainty in China is also a
 critical consideration; the Communist Party holds
 power, and reforms have undergone several ups
 and downs (Peng & Heath, 1996: 503). Political
 access enables Chinese firms to obtain government
 support and favorable policies that may help deal
 with such political uncertainty. For example, the
 China Youth Development Foundation initiated
 China's version of Project Hope in 1989, aiming to
 build Hope schools and help bring poor dropout
 children back to the classroom. Chinese companies
 (as well as individuals) have since donated over
 CNY35 billion to build 13,000 Hope primary
 schools, helping 2,900,000 poor students and train-
 ing 35,000 village school teachers. These contribu-
 tions are appreciated, especially by local govern-
 ments that do not have the financial means to build
 new schools, better roads, or other similar projects
 (Dickson, 2003). Government can reward firms that
 make such contributions with tax benefits, access
 to bank loans, easier project approval, and higher
 recognition and status for the owners (Bai, Lu, &
 Tao, 2006; Ma & Parish, 2006).
 In summary, Chinese stakeholders expect corpo-
 rate philanthropy because of the influence of tradi-
 tional values and recent sociopolitical factors. As a
 result, they are likely to respond to corporate phi-
 lanthropy by showing greater cooperation and sup-
 port. Moreover, the Chinese government and local
 authorities are more willing to cooperate with and
 recognize firms and managers who are active in
 charitable activities by providing them with critical
 resources when their rights are inadequately de-
 fined or enforced and when there is political un-
 certainty (Dickson, 2003; Nee, 1992). Sociopolitical
 1 Generated from the discussion between Confucius
 and one of his students, Zigong (Watson, 2007: 46).
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 legitimacy is critical for the success of Chinese
 firms, so Hypothesis 1 should hold for Chinese
 firms a fortiori.
 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CORPORATE
 PHILANTHROPY AND CORPORATE
 FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE: SOME
 CONTINGENCIES
 Although corporate philanthropy helps firms
 gain stakeholder and government support and is
 thus positively related to firm financial perfor-
 mance, the relationship between corporate philan-
 thropy and financial performance is expected to
 vary significantly with the different characteristics
 of firms and their operational environments. We
 consider several potential factors that may help
 determine this variance, namely, firm visibility and
 stakeholder expectation, which are considered to
 affect stakeholder response to corporate philan-
 thropy, and government ownership and political
 connections, which determine the firms' need for
 political resources.
 Positive Stakeholder Responses and the Benefits
 of Corporate Philanthropy
 Influences on stakeholder response to corporate
 philanthropy include firm visibility and stake-
 holder expectations. We capture firm visibility
 through two firm and environmental features: ad-
 vertising intensity and degree of market develop-
 ment. Stakeholder expectations, on the other hand,
 are thought to be influenced by a firm's past finan-
 cial performance.
 Firm visibility: Advertising intensity and mar-
 ket development Firm visibility serves as a pre-
 requisite for stakeholder response to firm actions.
 Some recent research has shown that a firm's visi-
 bility (or prominence) is generally associated with
 positive responses from its stakeholders, including
 favorable evaluations from investors and the media
 (Pollock et al., 2008), customers' willingness to pay
 a price premium (Rindova et al., 2005), and an
 increased attractiveness to potential alliance part-
 ners (Pollock & Gulati, 2007). On the other hand,
 since visible firms draw greater attention from their
 stakeholders, visibility may exacerbate the ten-
 dency for firms to take excess risks to meet height-
 ened stakeholder expectations. For instance,
 Mishina, Dykes, Block, and Pollock (2010) found ev-
 idence that firm prominence positively moderated
 the effect of performance above expectations on a
 firm's likelihood of engaging in illegal activities.
 In the case of corporate philanthropy, stakehold-
 ers have to know about a firm and have information
 about its charitable activities to make a meaningful
 response (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001). Thus, visi-
 bility should increase the benefit that a firm may
 obtain from corporate philanthropy. However, ex-
 ternal stakeholders such as suppliers and custom-
 ers may be only dimly or not at all aware of the
 extent of a firm's charitable activities, since they
 would not normally be direct beneficiaries (Wang,
 Choi, & Li, 2008). In the case of low visibility and
 stakeholder awareness, a firm will not benefit as
 much from engaging in philanthropy.
 The intensity of a firm's advertising can be an
 important indicator of its visibility. Clearly, inten-
 sive advertising and marketing attract more atten-
 tion from external stakeholders, especially from ex-
 isting and prospective customers and potential
 employees (Brammer & Millington, 2005). There-
 fore, a firm advertising heavily is more likely to be
 known to various stakeholders, and as a result its
 charitable contributions are more likely to be rec-
 ognized (Adams & Hardwick, 1998). It then follows
 that firms that do more advertising are likely to
 benefit more from their corporate philanthropy.
 These arguments should equally apply to Chinese
 firms, which have increasingly considered adver-
 tising as an investment with strategic implications
 (Luo, 2009).
 Hypothesis 2a. The positive relationship be-
 tween corporate philanthropy and a firm's fi-
 nancial performance increases with its adver-
 tising intensity.
 Aside from advertising, a firm's visibility or
 stakeholder awareness also depends on the level of
 development of the market in which it operates. In
 general, firms located in relatively developed mar-
 kets are more transparent and thus have higher
 visibility among the public and stakeholders. The
 public obtains information about a firm either di-
 rectly from it or through other channels, such as the
 media or the stock market (Fombrun & Shanley,
 1990). More developed markets not only provide
 firms with greater transactional efficiency, but also
 provide more advanced technology, media expo-
 sure, and capital markets, facilitating the flow of
 information from the firms to their stakeholders.
 Thus it is more likely that stakeholders of firms
 located in more developed markets will know
 about the firms' charitable contributions more
 promptly and accurately. Subsequently, these
 stakeholders will be in a better position to react to
 the charitable behavior by providing greater coop-
 eration and support, tending to improve firm per-
 formance. In contrast, the philanthropic efforts of
 firms competing in less developed markets will be
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 less noticed because information about them is not
 efficiently communicated.
 Although variations in the level of market devel-
 opment are often found among countries, in some
 economies such variations can be observed among
 regions. China is one such economy. Although
 China has made great progress in recent decades,
 the levels of market development in its different
 regions are far from equal (Fan & Wang, 2006). The
 coastal and eastern regions are relatively well de-
 veloped, but the central and western regions re-
 main largely underdeveloped. As a result, there are
 big differences among China's regions in prevailing
 wages, information flow, technology, and infra-
 structure (Qian, 2001). This logic leads to the
 following:
 Hypothesis 2b. The positive relationship be-
 tween corporate philanthropy and a firm's fi-
 nancial performance increases with the level of
 development of the market in which the firm
 operates.
 Stakeholder expectations: Past financial per-
 formance. Stakeholders are generally interested in
 corporate philanthropy and willing to respond pos-
 itively to a firm they know to be active in charitable
 activities, yet their expectations for and thus re-
 sponses to corporate philanthropy may be influ-
 enced by the extent to which a firm is financially
 constrained from engaging in such activities.
 Firms face both internal and external constraints
 that may limit managerial discretion over invest-
 ment decisions (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987).
 The constraints should be greater if the firms are to
 engage in activities that go beyond those directly
 related to their business operations. Thus, corpo-
 rate philanthropy, which is considered a social ac-
 tivity often remote from a firm's core business, is
 likely to face various constraints. Among the nu-
 merous factors, a firm's profitability (past financial
 performance) is considered to be one of the most
 important constraints on corporate philanthropy. A
 better-performing firm has more financial and
 physical resources that would allow it to engage in
 philanthropic activities. Consistently with this rea-
 soning, Dooley and Lerner (1994) found that firm
 performance influences the extent to which CEOs
 are concerned with the expectations of stakehold-
 ers. In the context of the current study, a profitable
 firm would have more financial and physical re-
 sources to devote to activities that go beyond those
 directly related to its business operations.
 Likewise, members of the public expect better-
 performing firms to contribute more to society.
 Moreover, they have greater motivation to reward
 those that do so. On the other hand, when a firm is
 performing poorly, stakeholders may understand
 that its limited resources should be used to im-
 prove its business operations instead of being di-
 verted to charity. Following this logic, good per-
 formers should benefit more from corporate
 philanthropy than poor performers, since the for-
 mer are more likely to receive a positive stake-
 holder response from their charitable giving.
 This logic may be better understood using an
 idea related to the association between pragmatic
 legitimacy and moral legitimacy (Suchman, 1995).
 "Pragmatic legitimacy" refers to the self-interested
 calculations of an organization's most immediate
 audiences, and "moral legitimacy," a construct
 very much in line with the social dimension of
 sociopolitical legitimacy (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994;
 Dart, 2004), refers to the public's normative evalu-
 ation of an organization and its activities (Such-
 man, 1995: 578-579). As argued earlier, corporate
 philanthropy helps a firm gain sociopolitical legit-
 imacy. However, pragmatic legitimacy, which is
 largely based on stakeholders' utility calculations
 (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Jones, 1995; Suchman,
 1995), may influence the value of gaining sociopo-
 litical legitimacy. Firms with high profitability are
 more likely to gain pragmatic legitimacy, typically
 by directing tangible rewards to stakeholders, such
 as granting employees better compensation, pro-
 viding shareholders higher dividends, and deliver-
 ing better-quality products to customers (Suchman,
 1995). If a firm lacks pragmatic legitimacy (i.e.,
 does not satisfy stakeholders' basic financial
 needs), stakeholders may attach less value to firm
 behaviors aimed at gaining sociopolitical or moral
 legitimacy. In other words, the concerns of stake-
 holders about a firm's contribution to society, and
 thus their motivations to respond positively,
 should be stronger when the firm has fulfilled its
 responsibility of meeting their basic finan-
 cial needs.
 Such differences in stakeholder responses to cor-
 porate philanthropy based on past firm perfor-
 mance should exist in both developed and devel-
 oping economies alike, including China.
 Hypothesis 2c. The positive relationship be-
 tween corporate philanthropy and a firm's fi-
 nancial performance increases with the level of
 the firm's past financial performance.
 Firm-Government Relationship and the Benefits
 of Corporate Philanthropy
 Governments everywhere exert a major influence
 on firms (Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Keim & Zeithami,
 1986). Through its policies and regulations, a gov-
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 emment can determine "the rules of commerce; the
 structure of markets (through barriers to entry and
 changes in cost structures due to regulations, sub-
 sidies, and taxation); the offerings of goods and
 services that are permissible; and the sizes of mar-
 kets based on government subsidies and pur-
 chases" (Schuler, Rehbein, & Cramer, 2002: 659).
 Thus, government policy and its enforcement con-
 stitute a major external source of uncertainty and a
 critical influence on a firm's operations (Hillman,
 Zardkoohi, & Bierman, 1999).
 According to resource dependence theory, firms
 can take political action to decrease risk and uncer-
 tainty associated with government influence (Hill-
 man, Withers, & Collins, 2009; Pfeffer & Salancik,
 1978). This is a compelling rationale for why firms
 strive to establish good relationships with govern-
 ments (e.g., Hillman, 2005; Hillman & Hitt, 1999).
 Firms that have good relations with their govern-
 ment can reduce the uncertainty associated with
 changes in government policy and regulations and
 thereby improve their long-run financial perfor-
 mance (Hillman, 2005). Previous research has ex-
 amined various measures firms may adopt to estab-
 lish good firm-government relations. These include
 lobbying, advocacy advertising, organizing politi-
 cal action committees, making financial contribu-
 tions, forming coalitions, and offering jobs to for-
 mer government officials (Getz, 1997; Hillman et
 al., 1999; Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Hillman, Keim, &
 Schuler, 2004; Lester, Hillman, Zardkoohi, & Can-
 nella, 2008; Shaffer, 1995).
 Unlike the above political tactics, which often
 explicitly target government, corporate philan-
 thropy targets society at large. Thus its connection
 with government and political resources is indirect
 and sometimes even unintentional. However, to the
 extent that corporate philanthropy meets govern-
 ment needs for providing social services, it may
 substitute for other means of establishing links
 with a government. Thus, viewed from a resource
 dependence perspective, corporate philanthropy
 helps a firm reduce the risks associated with gov-
 ernment influence. Consequently, firms more de-
 pendent on government for political resources
 should be more likely to benefit from corporate
 philanthropy.
 We examine two specific factors that may deter-
 mine a firm's degree of dependence on the govern-
 ment: government ownership and political connec-
 tions.
 Government ownership. Firms with varying de-
 grees of government ownership or government
 sponsorship are present around the globe, even in
 most market-oriented, developed economies (La
 Porta et al., 1999). For instance, although govern-
 ment ownership differs in magnitude and historical
 legacy across Europe, many European economies,
 including the United Kingdom, Germany, Ireland,
 Austria, Italy, have nontrivial government owner-
 ship (Faccio & Lang, 2002). Typical sectors with
 state ownership include telecommunications,
 power, petroleum, railways, airports, airlines, pub-
 lic transport, health care, ostal services, and
 banks. Many large industrial firms, such as British
 Steel, Statoil, and Irish Sugar, are also wholly or
 partially government-owned.
 The leaders of firms with government ownership
 or sponsorship generally do not have to worry
 about political access as much as the leaders of
 privately controlled firms do, because the firms
 already enjoy preferential treatment in terms of in-
 puts and access to product and capital markets
 (Wang, Wong, & Xia, 2008). For example, Hellman,
 Jones, and Kaufmann (2003) found that state-
 owned firms have more secure property, greater
 contractual rights, and closer ties with government.
 As a result, they enjoy significant advantages and
 exhibit faster growth. On the other hand, firms
 without government ownership have less secure
 property and contractual rights and thus are in
 greater need of assuring political access by estab-
 lishing good government relations through other
 means, such as corporate philanthropy. Therefore,
 non-government-owned firms have a greater need
 to gain political access through charitable activities
 and are thus likely to benefit more from corporate
 philanthropy.
 In China, non-government-owned, or privately
 controlled, firms have proliferated since the 1980s.
 But uncertainty about their legal status remains.
 Private ownership was declared legal in 1988, but
 owners remain worried about possible policy rever-
 sals that could devalue their ownership. Moreover,
 access to critical factors and capital resources such
 as debt financing is least favorable for privately
 controlled firms (Nee, 1992). To overcome these
 disadvantages, privately controlled firms may have
 incentives to engage in charitable activities as a
 means of creating goodwill with potential regula-
 tors and government officials (Neiheisel, 1994). A
 relevant survey showed that over 99 percent of all
 public officials and 80 percent of all private Chi-
 nese entrepreneurs believe that the social and po-
 litical status of entrepreneurs and their firms
 clearly improves when they contribute to local
 causes (Dickson, 2003).
 The above argument suggests that at the same
 level of corporate philanthropy, the political re-
 turns will be higher for non-government-owned
 firms than for government-owned ones.
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 Hypothesis За . The positive relationship be-
 tween corporate philanthropy and financial
 performance is stronger for privately controlled
 firms than for government-controlled firms.
 Political connections. It has been widely ob-
 served that firms with political connections may
 enjoy "preferential treatment by government-
 owned enterprises (such as banks or raw material
 producers), lighter taxation, preferential treatment
 in competition for government contracts, relaxed
 regulatory oversight of the company, or stiffer reg-
 ulatory oversight of its rivals, and many other
 forms" (Faccio, 2006: 369). Firms cultivate political
 connections to manage the dependencies that con-
 strain their actions, decreasing risk and uncer-
 tainty, and to gain access, information, legitimacy,
 and/or resources (Hillman, 2005). For instance, ac-
 cess to bank financing is known to be an important
 channel through which political connections oper-
 ate (Ciaessens, Feijen, & Laeven, 2008; Khwaja &
 Mian, 2005). Analyzing a sample of 450 politically
 connected firms from 35 countries (including the
 United States, the United Kingdom, and other de-
 veloped countries) during 1997-2002, Faccio,
 Masulis, and McConnell (2006) found that politi-
 cally connected firms were significantly more
 likely to be bailed out from economic distress than
 similar, poorly connected firms.
 In China, political connections between firms
 and the government are quite common. For exam-
 ple, the government may appoint a CEO or direc-
 tors with political backgrounds for a government-
 owned company, with the objective of achieving
 better control of the firm and appropriating rents in
 the long run (Fan, Wong, & Zhang, 2007). However,
 such political connections are not limited to gov-
 ernment-owned firms; some private firms may also
 have CEOs and/or directors with strong political
 backgrounds. For Chinese firms, a good relation-
 ship with the government is often instrumental for
 gaining institutional support (Peng & Luo, 2000;
 Xin & Pearce, 1996) and critical resources such as
 bank loans (Bai et al., 2006). Thus, companies with-
 out political connections have a strong incentive to
 cultivate them, in order to gain access to factor and
 capital resources critical to firm growth (Nee, 1992).
 Thus, many of our points regarding the effect of
 ownership on the relationship between philan-
 thropy and financial performance can also be ap-
 plied to political connections. Firms that lack po-
 litical connections may find they need to use
 philanthropy as a substitute in creating good will
 with the government (Ma & Parish, 2006; Neiheisel,
 1994). Firms that already have access to political
 resources, in contrast, have little need to do so.
 Therefore, the political benefits that firms obtain
 from c r orate philanthropy should depend on
 their need for political resources (Li & Zhang, 2007;
 Peng & Luo, 2000).
 Hypothesis 3b. The positive relationship e
 tween corporate phila thropy and financial
 performance is stronger for firms without po-
 litical co nections than for those with political
 connections.
 METHODS
Data and Sample
 Our sample comprised all Chinese firms listed on
 either the Shenzhen or Shanghai stock exchange
 between 2001 and 2006. The combined capitaliza-
 tion of the two exchanges was approximately 46
 percent of China's gross domestic product (GDP) in
 2006. 2 We chose 2001 as the initial study year
 because the quality of reported company informa-
 tion substantially improved in that year and after-
 ward (Fan et al., 2007). Several data sources were
 used: the China Stock Market and Accounting Re-
 search (CSMAR) database, the National Economic
 Research Institute (NERI), and company annual re-
 ports. As one of the largest databases on Chinese
 listed firms, CSMAR serves as the primary source
 of information on Chinese stock markets and the
 financial statements of China's exchange-listed
 firms. It was designed and developed by GTA In-
 formation Technology, one of the major providers
 of data related to Chinese companies. The NERI
 provides information on provincial market devel-
 opment.
 Company a nual reports, our primary source of
 information about firms' political connections and
 corporate charitable contributions, were collected
 from the official web sites of the Shenzhen and
 Shanghai exchanges and the China Securities Reg-
ulatory Commission (CSRC). Some of the reports
 contained brief biographical sketches of the firms'
 CEOs, containing their experiences in industry and
 government (Fan et al., 2007). For those firms with-
 out CEO biographical information, we manually
 searched for their profiles and company codes on
 the web and coded the information accordingly.
 The annual reports also listed annual spending on
 charitable and sponsorship activities. Because of
 the need to log-transform the amounts, we confined
 our sample to those reporting nonzero contribu-
 tions in their annual reports. According to the dis-
 2 China Securities Regulatory Commission: http://
 www.csrc.gov.cn.
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 closure regulations for corporate philanthropy in
 China's Accounting Standard for Business Enter-
 prises, Chinese firms are required to report such
 contributions. Moreover, apart from the public re-
 lations benefits, firms that engaged in philanthropy
 have strong tax reasons to report their expenses.
 Hence, the sample was limited to firms that actu-
 ally engaged in charitable activities.
 Simply conducting regression analysis with this
 sa ple of firms, however, would not have been
 appropriate. This is because firms that engaged in
 philanthropic activities may differ systematically
 from those that did not. Specifically, it is possible
 that the factors affecting whether a firm engages in
 corporate giving may be correlated with our depen-
 dent variable - firm financial performance. We
 therefore used a two-stage Heckman selection
 model (Heckman, 1979) to correct for any such
 sample selection bias. In such analyses, parameter
 estimates from a first-stage probit model based on
 information that represents all the firms in a pop-
 ulation are incorporated into the second stage. This
 two-stage approach also ensured comparability
 with some of the previous research in this area (e.g.,
 Brammer & Millington, 2008; Wang, Choi, & Li,
 2008). After we had merged the three databases and
 removed observations with missing key explana-
 tory variables, the final unbalanced sample con-
 tained 1,453 firms and 2,765 firm-year observa-
 tions.3
 Measures
 Financial performance. Two measures of finan-
 cial performance were employed: return on assets
 (ROA) and market-to-book ratio. ROA, calculated
 as net income over total assets, is a common ac-
 counting-based measure of financial performance.
 Market-to-book ratio4 is calculated as the book
 value of a firm's equity divided by the year-end
 market value of its equity (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Col-
 lins, Kinney, & LaFond, 2008). Both measures have
 been commonly used in management research (e.g.,
 Hillman, 2005; Tuschke & Sanders, 2003). There is
 often a lag between corporate contributions and
 their impact on financial performance, so the rela-
 tionship between corporate contributions and fi-
 nancial performance was evaluated in terms of
 ROA and market-to-book ratio following the year in
 which the charitable contributions were made (a
 one-year lag).
 Corporate philanthropy. Corporate giving was
 assessed as the amount of a firm's charitable con-
 tributions during a sp cific year. The variable was
 highly skewed, so, following the lead of previous
 studies (Adams & Hardwick, 1998; Galaskiewicz,
 1997), we computed its natural logarithm.
 Moderating variables. Firm advertising inten-
 sity was calculated as the ratio of selling, general,
 and administrative expenses to sales. It captures a
 firm's willingness to spend on marketing and sell-
 ing-related activities in an effort to differentiate
 itself from competitors (Berman et al., 1999; Ham-
 brick, 1983; McWilliams & Siegel, 2001; Seifert et
 al., 2004). Market development was assessed from
 indexes developed by the NERI (Fan & Wang, 2006)
 and computed using data from Chinese statistical
 yearbooks, reports from the administrations of in-
 dustry and commerce, and surveys. Th  NERI in-
 dexes capture the pr gress of institutional develop-
 ment in all 31 Chinese provinces, municipalities,
 and autonomous regions. Followin  the lead of pre-
 vious research (Fan et l., 2007), we used one in-
 dex - a province's GDP divided by its government's
 budget - to measure market development This
 variable was used to reflect the extent to which
 provincial resources are allocated by markets rather
 than through the redistribution system of the Chi-
 nese government. The development score of the
 province where a firm operates was used as the
 level of market development for the firm. For firms
 op rating in multiple provinces, we used the score
 of its primary location.5 Past financial performance
 was measured as ROA and market-to-book ratio
 lagged by one year.
 Government ownership was a dummy variable
 coded 1 if the ultimate owner of a firm was the
 Chinese government and its agencies and 0 other-
 wise (Wang, Wong, & Xia, 2008). Following the
 methods of previous research on the political con-
 nections of China's listed firms (Fan et al., 2007; Li,
 Meng, Wang, & Zhou, 2008; Li, Meng, & Zhang,
 2006), we used a firm's CEO's affiliation with gov-
 ernment as an indicator of the firm's political con-
 nections, which was a dummy variable equal to 1 if
 the CEO was an official of the central or a local
 government, or of the military, and 0 otherwise. 3 Note that the final observations used in the regres- sion cover 2001-05 instead of the sample period of
 2001-06 because of our use of a lagged regression
 structure.
 4 This measure is theoretically and empirically equiv-
 alent to Tobin's Q. Chung and Pruitt (1994) found that
 market-to-book ratio explains at least 96 percent of the
 variance in the more sophisticated Tobin's Q.
 5 This is reasonable because most Chinese firms com-
 pete on a local and regional basis owing to the fact that
 nationwide markets are not yet fully developed
 (Peng, 2004).
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 Control variables . Firm size, age, and debt-to-
 asset ratio were controlled for. Firm size, measured
 as the natural log of total assets, has been shown to
 be an important variable in studies of the relation-
 ship between social and financial performance (Or-
 litzky, 2001). Larger firms have more resources and
 may enjoy economies of scale or scope (Roberts &
 Dowling, 2002). Firm age was measured as the
 number of years since a firm's initial public offer-
 ing. Firms with different ages may have different
 cost structures; older firms may have organiza-
 tional inertia, which is expected to affect firm per-
 formance (Barnett & Salomon, 2006). Debt ratio ,
 measured as the ratio of long-term debt to total
 assets, has also been included in previous studies
 on social-financial performance relationships (see
 Barnett & Salomon, 2006; Seifert et al., 2004; Wad-
 dock & Graves, 1997). Furthermore, to control for
 possible differences in philanthropic activity
 among industries (Seifert et al., 2004), we included
 12 industry dummies representing 13 different in-
 dustry categories6 identified by the CSRC.
 All these control variables were included in the
 first-stage probit model to predict the likelihood
 that a firm would make charitable contributions,
 but all were lagged by one additional year. Firm
 size, age, and debt ratio may have some effects on
 the likelihood of a firm's engagement in corporate
 philanthropy. Larger and older firms have greater
 visibility, and they attract more scrutiny from the
 public (Adams & Hardwick, 1998; Saiia et al., 2003;
 Seifert et al., 2004). A firm's debt ratio reflects the
 financial constraints its managers face, which in
 turn affect their discretion in making charitable
 contributions (Adams & Hardwick, 1998; Brammer
 & Millington, 2008). Firms with greater need to
 advertise may be more likely to engage in corporate
 philanthropy because philanthropy is often consid-
 ered a form of advertising that improves image and
 reputation (Seifert et al., 2004). As has been argued
 earlier, firms with better financial performance
 may be more likely to make contributions, since
 they can better afford to do so. Thus, we also in-
 cluded prior financial performance in the first-
 stage model. Government ownership and CEO po-
 litical connections were also included in the first-
 stage model because they may affect the likelihood
 of a firm's makin  charitable contributions (e.g., Ma
 & Parish, 2006).
 In addition, the first-stage equation of the Heck-
man model included slack resources and industry-
 aver ge haritable contributions. Previous studies
 have shown that a firm's slack resources are an
 important antecedent of its charitable activitie  (see
 Buchholtz, Amason, & Rutherford, 1999; Seifert et
 al., 2004). Following Seifert and colleagues (2004),
 we measured slack resources as the total cash flow
 from a firm's operations, financing, and investing
 activities, scaled by its total asse s. The behavior of
 its industry peers has been shown to affect a firm's
 phi anthropic behavior (Galaskiewicz & Bur ,
 1991). Thus, we included industry-level giving in
 the first-stag  mod l as well. Because industry-
 level giving is thought to affect charitable behavior
 but is less likely to have any direct impact n a
 firm's financial perfo mance, it also served as a
 valid instrumental variable. Note that altho gh past
 financial performance is a moderating variable, it
 was also included in all models as a control in the
 second stage. Including a lagged dependent vari-
 able in the equation is a common approach used in
 dealing with pooled time series and cross-sectional
 panel data (e.g., Beck & Katz, 1995; Dittmar &
 Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Harford, Mansi, & Maxwell,
 2008; Wang, Choi, & Li, 2008). In the context of this
 study, we included it to mitigate concern about
 reverse causality (i.e., good financial performance
 leads to greater philanthropy instead of the other
 way around).7
 Estimation Method
 The first stage of the Heckman process involved
 estimating the degree to which a firm's level of
 charitable contributions differed from that pre-
 dicted by various firm and industry factors. The
 likelihood of a firm's charitable contributions was
 estimated by applying a probit model to the entire
 sample of firms, including firms in both the main
 sample and the control group. We calculated an
 adjustment term, the inverse Mills ratio, from the
 first-stage probit regression. The ratio was then in-
 cluded as a control variable in the main second-
 6 The categories are agriculture, forestry, livestock
 rearing and fishing; mining; manufacturing; electric
 power, gas, and water production and supply; construc-
 tion; transport and storage; information technology;
 wholesale and retail trade; finance and insurance; real
 estate; social service; communication and cultural indus-
 tries; and a comprehensive residual category.
 7 To ensure that including a lagged dependent variable
 did not result in biased estimations owing to the poten-
 tial existence of serial correlated errors, we ran a Prais-
 Winsten (1954) regression estimation, which uses the
 generalized least squares method to estimate the param-
 eters in a linear regression model in which the errors are
 assumed to follow a first-order autoregressive process.
 The Prais analysis results were consistent with what we
 report here, so autocorrelation was not a serious concern.
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 TABLE 1
 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
 Panel Л: Heckman First-Stage Variables11
 Variables Mean s.d. 123456789 10
 1. Giving choice dummy 0.47 0.50
 2. Firm age 4.97 3.04 .01
 3. Firm size 21.05 0.91 .14 .05
 4. Slack resources 0.02 0.12 .01 -.20 -.04
 5. Debt ratio 0.06 0.12 .01 .00 .13 -.02
 6. Advertising intensity 0.23 0.40 -.08 .11 -.24 -.10 .07
 7. ROA 0.01 0.11 .06 -.14 .16 .15 -.05 -.32
 8. Market-to-book ratio 3.45 5.29 -.05 .02 -.22 .02 -.06 .07 -.03
 9. Government ownership 0.76 0.42 .04 -.04 .18 -.03 .04 -.12 .12 -.03
 10. CEO political connections 0.22 0.41 .05 -.03 .06 .00 .03 -.02 .05 -.02 .00
 11. Industry level of giving 12.26 0.51 .04 -.14 .14 .02 .03 -.04 .11 -.04 .12 .08
 a The dependent variable is measured for year f; the independent variable, for t - 1. Correlations > 1 0.03 I are significant at p ^ .05; n
 = 5,932.
 Panel B: Heckman Second-Stage Variablesb
 Variables Mean s.d. 123456789 10 11 12
 1. ROA 0.01 0.09
 2. Market-to-book ratio 2.86 4.48 .02
 3. Past financial performance 0.02 0.08 .44 -.04
 (ROA)
 4. Past financial performance 3.17 4.69 -.07 .57 -.03
 (market-to-book ratio)
 5. Firm age 5.98 3.13 -.07 .03 -.12 .00
 6. Firm size 21.28 0.90 .15 -.15 .22 -.21 .09
 7. Debt ratio 0.06 0.08 .04 -.04 .00 -.06 -.04 .24
 8. Inverse Mills ratio 0.82 0.16 -.07 .08 -.09 .19 -.08 -.63 -.11
 9. Advertising intensity 0.21 0.32 -.30 .03 -.60 .08 .02 -.20 -.04 .17
 10. Market development 7.83 2.55 .07 -.06 .08 -.09 .05 .15 -.07 -.04 -.08
 11. Government ownership 0.76 0.42 .13 -.04 .06 -.06 .02 .15 .06 -.18 -.08 -.02
 12. CEO political connections 0.25 0.43 .02 .05 .02 .03 -.01 .04 .06 -.21 -.02 -.02 .02
 13. Corporate giving 11.36 2.00 .16 -.06 .16 -.10 -.02 .38 .08 -.25 -.06 .04 .03 .03
 b The dependent variable is measured for year t + 1; the independent variable, for t. Correlations ^ 1 0.04 1 are significant at p ^ .05;
 n = 2,765.
 stage equation (see Heckman, 1979), which examined
 the relationship between corporate philanthropy
 and financial performance using the sample of
 firms that had made charitable contributions.
 Specifically, the following equation was used to
 test the hypotheses in the second stage:
 iTt+1 = ßo + + $2givingt + ß3moderatorst
 + ß4gjVingf X moderatorst + ß5IMRt + ß6X, + eř
 where nt+1 and тг, are corporate financial perfor-
 mance and its lagged value, respectively. X is a set
 of control variables expected to influence corporate
 financial performance. Giving is a continuous vari-
 able that reflects the level of corporate charitable
 giving for each firm-year observation. Moderators
 represent the several contingent factors mentioned
 in the hypotheses, including advertising intensity,
 market development, past financial performance,
 government ownership, and political connections.
 "IMR" is the inverse Mills ratio based on the first-
 stage model. The e is an error term.
 RESULTS
 Descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix
 are presented in Table 1. Panel A of Table 1 in-
 cludes the variables used in the first-stage probit
 model of the two-stage Heckman analysis. The
 mean (0.47) and standard deviation (0.50) of the
 dummy variable giving choice are comparable to
 those of in previous study with a U.S. sample
 (Wang, Choi, & Li, 2008). As expected, firm size,
 government ownership, and CEO's political con-
 nections were significantly correlated to the likeli-
 hood of charitable giving. The descriptive statistics
 and correlation matrix for the key variables used in
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 TABLE 2
 Probit Estimates for Heckman First-Stage Model:
 Giving Choice Regressed on Firm and Industry Predictorsa
 Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
 Intercept -3.73*** (0.42) -3.62*** (0.42) -4.92*** (0.63)
 Firm age 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
 Firm size 0.17*** (0.02) 0.17*** (0.02) 0.18*** (0.02)
 Slack resources 0.04 (0.14) 0.05 (0.14) 0.04 (0.15)
 Debt ratio -0.10 (0.18) -0.11 (0.18) -0.04 (0.18)
 Advertising intensity -0.10*** (0.03) -0.10*** (0.03) -0.09** (0.03)
 ROA 0.39* (0.17) 0.36* (0.17) 0.45** (0.17)
 Market-to-book ratio -0.01 (0.00) -0.01 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
 Government ownership 0.02 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02)
 CEO political connections 0.05** (0.02) 0.04** (0.02)
 Industry level of giving 0.09** (0.04)
 Industry dummies Included Included Included
 Log-likelihood -4,026.6 -4,022.2 -3,970.6
 Д*2 8.7* 1 ***
 a Standard errors are in parentheses. "Giving choice" was measured for year i; firm and industry predictors, for year t - 1; n = 5,932.
 * p < .05
 ** p < .01
 *** p < .001
 the second stage of the Heckman analysis are pre-
 sented in panel В of Table 1. The correlations be-
 tween the level of charitable giving and subsequent
 financial performance were positive for ROA (0.16)
 but not for market-to-book ratio (-0.06). Significant
 correlations were found among some variables,
 such as ROA, advertising intensity, and firm size;
 hence, we further investigated whether there was a
 potential multicollinearity problem by computing
 variance inflation factors (VIFs). The maximum VIF
 obtained in any of the models was 7.81 (firm size),
 and the mean VIF was around 2.40, substantially
 below the rule-of-thumb cutoff of 10.00 for regres-
 sion models (Ryan, 1997). Therefore, multicol-
 linearity was not an important issue in our results.
 First-Stage Giving Choice Estimates
 Table 2 presents the results of the first-stage
 Heckman selection model, which was a probit re-
 gression of the choice of charitable giving against
 the factors thought to predict whether a firm will
 engage in charitable giving. The dependent variable
 was the dummy variable giving choice , indicating
 whether a firm engaged in corporate giving. Model
 1, the baseline model, included an intercept term
 and the measures of firm-level variables. Model 2
 added industry-level giving and industry dummy
 variables as additional factors expected to affect
 corporate giving behavior. As anticipated, larger
 firms were found to be more likely to engage in
 charitable giving. The coefficients on firm age and
 slack resources had positive but insignificant signs.
 Prior financial performance measured as ROA
 showed a positive impact on corporate philan-
 thropy, but the market-based performance measure
 did not yield a significant effect. As expected, CEO
 political connections and industry-level giving
 were positively associated with the choice of cor-
 porate giving. Contrary to expectations (Seifert et
 al., 2004), however, advertising intensity had a neg-
 ative and significant impact on the probability of
 giving. Possibly direct advertising and corporate
 philanthropy are considered substitutive means of
 attracting positive public responses. Moreover,
 Chinese listed firms are still in the early stages of
 development and facing stringent financial con-
 straints. Thus, as advertising expenses increase,
 Chinese firms may defer corporate giving.
 Second-Stage Financial Performance Estimates
 Table 3 presents the results of Heckman's sec-
 ond-stage estimation using the inverse Mills ratio
 from the first-stage probit model in Table 2, ac-
 counting for selection bias. Panels A and В corre-
 spond to the models using the two different mea-
 sures of financial performance: ROA and market-
 to-book ratio. Hierarchical multiple regression
 analysis was used to test for the hypothesized pos-
 itive relationship between corporate contributions
 and financial performance and to test for the inter-
 action effects.
 Models Al and Bl report the effects of the basic
 firm-level control variables: past (lagged) financial
 performance, firm age, firm size, and debt ratio.
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 Models A2 and B2 have the proposed moderators
 added, namely, advertising intensity, market devel-
 opment, government ownership, and CEO political
 connections. Past financial performance showed a
 significant, positive relationship with financial
 performance. Firm age was negatively associated
 with ROA but not with market-to-book ratio. Al-
 though firm size was negatively associated with
 market-to-book ratio, market development and gov-
 ernment ownership were positively associated
 with ROA.
 In models A3 and B3, the level of corporate giv-
 ing was added to the regression equation. In the
 subsequent models A4-A8 and B4-B8, we sequen-
 tially added the interaction terms between corpo-
 rate giving and the key moderating variables (ad-
 vertising intensity, market development, past
 financial performance, government ownership, and
 CEO political connections). Models A8 and B8 are
 the full models including all the interactions. We
 reported the results based on these two full models.
 In keeping with our prediction, corporate giving
 had a positive and significant relationship with
 financial performance measured as ROA (p < .001).
 It was not, however, significantly related to market-
 to-book ratio. These results partially support Hy-
 pothesis 1.
 Hypotheses 2a and 2b predict that advertising
 intensity and the level of market development pos-
 itively moderate the relationship between corpo-
 rate giving and financial performance. As shown in
 models A8 and B8, the interaction term between
 corporate giving and advertising intensity was pos-
 itive and significant for both ROA and market-to-
 book ratio, strongly supporting Hypothesis 2a.
 However, the interaction term between corporate
 giving and market development was significant for
 market-to-book ratio but not for ROA, so was also
 partially supported.
 Hypothesis 2c predicts that past financial perfor-
 mance positively moderates the relationship be-
 tween corporate giving and financial performance.
 The coefficient on the interaction term in models
 A8 and B8 was significant for both measures of firm
 financial performance (both at p < .001). Therefore,
 Hypothesis 2c was supported.
 Hypotheses 3a and 3b predict that the positive
 relationship between corporate giving and finan-
 cial performance is stronger for privately controlled
 firms and for firms without political connections.
 The negative and significant coefficients of the in-
 teraction term between corporate giving and gov-
 ernment ownership for both measures of financial
 performance were consistent with our prediction
 (ROA, at p < .05; market-to-book ratio, at p < .01).
 Thus, Hypothesis 3a was supported. The coeffi-
 cients for the interaction term between CEO polit-
 ical connections and corporate giving, however,
 w re not significant for ither measure of financial
 performance. Hence, we did not find ny support
for Hypothesis 3b.
 To interpret these results better, we used Aiken
 and West's (1991) approach to plot the significant
 interaction effects (Figures 1A-4B ). The figures
 show that at high levels of advertising intensity,
 market development, and past financial perfor-
 mance, the relationship between corporate giving
 and firm performance is more positive. In contrast,
 at low levels of these variables the relationship
 tends to become negative or less positive. Also, the
 relationship is more positive for firms that are pri-
 vately controlled.
 These effects are both statistically and practically
 significant. For example, for firms with high visi-
 bility as indicated by advertising intensity, as cor-
 porate giving increases by one standard deviation,
 ROA increases by 1.2 percent, and market-to-book
 ratio increases by 15 percent (see models A8 and B8
 and the corresponding Figure 1A and IB). In con-
 trast, for firms with low levels of advertising inten-
 sity, the same increase in giving is associated with
 slight decreases in ROA (by 0.03%) and sharp de-
 creases in market-to-book ratio (by 18.5%). In Fig-
 ure 2, for firms operating in more developed re-
 gions, as giving increases by one standard
 deviation, market-to-book ratio increases by 18 per-
 cent; in contrast, the figure shows a decrease in the
 ratio of 21 percent for firms in less developed re-
 gions. Similarly, significant patterns of change can
 also be found for models with other moderators,
 including past financial performance and govern-
 ment ownership, as shown in Figures ЗА, 3B, 4A,
 and 4B.
 DISCUSSION
 We have argued that corporate philanthropy en-
 hances a firm's financial performance by eliciting
 positive responses from its key stakeholders, such
 as employees, customers, and investors, and by
 gaining political resources from government. More-
 over, we have suggested that this positive relation-
 ship between corporate philanthropy and financial
 performance should be contingent on the extent to
 which stakeholders positively respond to philan-
 thropic giving and on whether the firm is in need of
 political access. Our analyses generally supported
 these predictions using either accounting or mar-
 ket-based financial performance measures. We
 found a positive relationship between corporate
 philanthropy and financial performance as mea-
 sured by ROA (though not for performance mea-
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 FIGURE 1A
 Interaction Effect between Corporate Giving and Advertising Intensity on ROA
 FIGURE IB
 Interaction Effect between Corporate Giving and Advertising Intensity on Market-to-Book Ratio
 sured as market-to-book ratio). Further, the rela-
 tionship was generally stronger for highly visible
 and profitable firms and for firms in need of polit-
 ical resources.
 This study makes a number of contributions to
 the literature on corporate philanthropy. First,
 building on the general idea that corporate philan-
 thropy helps firms gain sociopolitical legitimacy,
 we have identified two mechanisms - eliciting pos-
 itive stakeholder responses and gaining political
 access - that underlie the relationship between phi-
 lanthropy and performance. These findings help
 bu ld a stronger theoretical foundation for a link
between corporate philanthropy and financial per-
 formance.
 We have also further elucidated the contingent
 factors influencing the relationship between corpo-
 rate philanthropy and financial performance. Our
 findings that firm visibility, stakeholder expecta-
 tions, and firm dependence on political resources
 have significant moderating effects on the relation-
 ship suggest that a firm's own characteristics and
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 FIGURE 2
 Interaction Effect between Corporate Giving and Market Development on Market-to-Book Ratio
 its social-political environment play an important
 role in determining the extent to which it can ben-
 efit from corporate philanthropy. Previous research
 has only occasionally hinted at but never explicitly
 examined the testable hypotheses that we have pro-
 posed. There have been calls for an examination of
 the conditions delimiting the social responsibility-
 financial performance relationship (Barnett, 2007;
 Hull & Rothenberg, 2008), and this study is a re-
 sponse providing a better understanding of the un-
 derlying mechanisms through which corporate phi-
 lanthropy is related to a firm's financial
 performance.
 According to the meta-analysis of 167 studies of
 corporate social and financial performance by Mar-
 golis, Elfenbein, and Walsh (2007), no previous
 study has investigated the relationship between
 corporate philanthropy and financial performance
 in a transition economy. Transition economies
 such as China are different from developed markets
 in which institutional conditions are well estab-
 lished, so they offer a promising new context for
 examining the generalizability of findings devel-
 oped in Western contexts (Wright, Filatotchev,
 Hoskisson, & Peng, 2005). The results developed
 here demonstrate that without understanding a so-
 ciety's broad values and political system, one may
 fail to understand philanthropy and its implica-
 tions for corporate financial performance in a com-
 plex social system.
 These results have practical implications as well.
 There have been debates about whether firms
 should engage in philanthropic activities (e.g., Grif-
 fin & Mahon, 1997; Orlitzky et al., 2003; Saiia et al.,
 2003). We contend that charitable giving is not only
 consistent with Chinese traditional values (thus
 eliciting positive responses from various stakehold-
 ers), but can also help Chinese firms gain legiti-
 macy and political support from their government.
 This view suggests that it is generally helpful for
 Chinese managers to commit firm resources to cor-
 porate philanthropy. However, we have further
 demonstrated that Chinese firms do not all equally
 benefit from philanthropy. Stakeholders will re-
 spond more positively when they are aware of such
 activities, so firms with more visibility, such as
 those advertising heavily and/or operating in more
 developed regions, have the most to gain. Managers
 whose firms are already active in corporate philan-
 thropy should find ways to attract the attention of
 stakeholders and to make them aware of the firms'
 contributions. In addition, seeing that the relation-
 ship between corporate philanthropy and financial
 performance strengthens with past performance,
 managers of successful firms should be more active
 in philanthropic activities. In contrast, firms per-
 forming poorly have less to gain from engaging in
 charitable giving. They might instead place greater
 emphasis on improving operational efficiency.
 Managers of privately owned firms should be par-
 ticularly active in corporate philanthropic activi-
 ties because they are in greater need of political
 support and resources from the government.
 The interpretation of the current findings should
 be considered in light of the limitations associated
 with this study. First, we focused on only one di-
 mension of corporate social activity: corporate phi-
 lanthropy and its links with financial performance.
 Future research might profitably examine other di-
 mensions of social responsibility, such as those
 associated with the environment, products, and
 community activities. In addition, a systematic ex-
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 FIGURE ЗА
 Interaction Effect between Corporate Giving and Firm Past Financial Performance on ROA
 FIGURE 3B
 Interaction Effect between Corporate Giving and Firm Past Financial Performance on
 Market-to-Book Ratio
 amination of corporate social responsibility in tran-
 sition economies in general could be promising. Of
 course, unlike in the United States, where there are
 secondhand databases that evaluate corporate so-
 cial performance, the collection of data on corpo-
 rate social behaviors is generally more challenging
 in China and in other transition economies. But as
 data on other dimensions of corporate social per-
 formance in transitional contexts become gradually
 available, it would be very interesting to under-
 stand whether those activities have the same im-
 pact on corporate financial performance as corpo-
 rate philanthropy does.
 Second, although we have argued that corporate
 philanthropy influences financial performance by
 eliciting positive stakeholder responses and/or by
 affording political access, data limitations pre-
 vented our directly measuring some of the factors
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 FIGURE 4A
 Interaction Effect between Corporate Giving and Ownership Type on ROA
 FIGURE 4B
 Interaction Effect between Corporate Giving and Ownership Type on Market-to-Book Ratio
 (e.g., stakeholder response) underlying these mech-
 anisms. We have, though, identified several key
 conditions for which these two mechanisms are
 likely to be critical. The arguments and empirical
 tests would be greatly strengthened if future studies
 could directly explore these underlying mecha-
 nisms or, alternatively, find even better conditional
 factors. For example, future studies might go be-
 yond the factors that we have identified as influ-
 encing stakeholder responses (firm visibility and
 stakeholder expectation) and study the perfor-
 mance benefits of eliciting positive responses.
 Moreover, our measurements of some of the mod-
 erating variables have limitations. For example, the
 moderating effect of political connections was
 found to be relatively weak, but this might be be-
 cause our measure focused only on the connections
 of a firm's CEO. Future research might set out to
 construct more robust measures, including, for ex-
 ample, other political connections through board
 members and a firm's other top managers. Also, in
 addition to the two variables that we have used to
 capture the need for political resources (ownership
 type and political connections), future research
 could examine other contingent factors that could
 reflect a firm's political access, such as whether its
 managers are involved in political networking (Li &
 Zhang, 2007).
 Fourth, we used advertising expenditures as our
 proxy for visibility, but our finding that it posi-
 tively influences the relationship between philan-
 thropy and financial performance contrasts with
 those of Hull and Rothenberg (2008). They sug-
 gested that corporate social activities function as a
 differentiating mechanism that can substitute for
 advertising and innovation. Drawing on this logic,
This content downloaded from 202.161.43.77 on Mon, 11 Jun 2018 05:46:03 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 1178 Academy of Management Journal December
 Hull and Rothenberg (2008) concluded that adver-
 tising, as a form of industry differentiation, nega-
 tively affects the social-financial performance rela-
 tionship. Future studies might fruitfully attempt to
 resolve these somewhat contradictory arguments.
 In particular, it would be worthwhile to examine
 whether the opposite findings reflect differences in
 the empirical contexts (China vs. the United States)
 or differences between philanthropy and corporate
 social responsibility in general.
 Lastly, although we tried our best to check and
 improve the validity of our main constructs, data
 from a developing country such as China may raise
 validity concerns in general. Future researchers
 may consider testing these arguments using alter-
 native data, such as those from developed econo-
 mies. Also, our sample was limited to publicly
 listed companies. Despite their large total market
 capitalization, publicly listed companies only rep-
 resent a subset of Chinese enterprises, and good
 performance was presumably a prerequisite for
 stock market listing (Xu & Wang, 1999). Our results
 should therefore be generalized only with caution,
 as their applicability may be limited to the unique
 cultural and social environment surrounding listed
 Chinese companies. Future research could attempt
 to confirm these results in other economies, includ-
 ing both developing and developed ones.
 Conclusions
 By analyzing data on the philanthropic activities
 of publicly listed Chinese firms from 2001 to 2006,
 we have demonstrated that corporate philanthropy
 enhances corporate financial performance by en-
 abling firms to elicit better stakeholder responses
 and to gain political resources. We hope that this
 study will serve as an important step toward a
 better understanding of the relationship between
 corporate social behavior and financial perfor-
 mance. Future studies can bring new insights by
 examining the influence of other potential factors,
 especially those related to various sociopolitical
 contexts, on the relationship between corporate
 philanthropy and firm financial performance.
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